Nuclear Weapon Security

Signs posted on the gated wall around Los Alamos National Laboratory keep visitors informed about security.
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Signs posted on the gated wall around the main technical area of Los Alamos National Laboratory keep visitors informed about security.

So how good is the security around nuclear weapons? The United States, as one example, typically uses "barriers, guards, surveillance cameras, motion sensors and background checks on personnel" in any situation where an arsenal of weapons exists [source: CFR]. Human error or corruption is always a possibility, of course, so none of these precautions is infallible.

Nuclear weapons themselves are guarded with many safety measures. One of the main precautions is a sophisticated electronic system called a permissive action link, in which two correct codes must be inserted in order to arm the bomb. This uses a "two man rule" principle, making it nearly impossible for a person to detonate a weapon by himself.

Close Calls

A long history of near catastrophic accidents with nuclear weapons makes some wonder what we should worry more about -- people stealing nukes or people simply dropping them. The Center for Defense Information notes that although the number of reported accidents is vague, even the Department of Defense recognizes that "at least one serious nuclear accident occurred every year" since the Atomic Age began [source: CDI].

In 1965, for instance, an improperly secured airplane carrying nuclear arms rolled off the aircraft carrier USS Ticonderoga and sank into 16,000 feet of ocean off the coast of Japan. In another maritime accident in 1981, a nuclear bomb being carried off the submarine fell seventeen feet and nearly crashed into the USS Holland -- an emergency brake caught the fall just above the hull. The Carolinas seem to have bad luck, too. A B-47 bomber flying over Mars Bluff, S.C., in 1958 accidentally dropped an atomic bomb and left a crater 75 feet wide and 35 feet deep. A separate incident in North Carolina was less destructive but much scarier. Just three years later, a B-52 bomber carrying two 24-megaton hydrogen bombs crashed in Goldsboro, N.C. Neither bomb exploded, but only one of the six safety devices worked in one of the bombs. It would have been a disaster 1,800 times more powerful than the bomb that exploded over Hiroshima [source: Nuclear Files].

Other countries may not have top-notch security, increasing the risk of material being stolen. Russia is constantly cited as an example of dubious security efforts -- the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union complicated matters because officials didn't keep proper records. Authorities are notorious for treating guards and other employees at weapons facilities very poorly by failing to pay on time. Instead of going home happy with a nice paycheck, workers might be tempted to make a quick buck by selling top-secret information or smuggling dangerous materials. The United States also has limited information on the safety devices within Russian nuclear weapons themselves, so it remains unclear what kind of steps developers have taken to safeguard the detonation of a nuclear device.

Another concern is the black market in nuclear materials, in which low-grade plutonium or uranium is smuggled for money. The chances of making an effective nuclear bomb out of this so-called "nuclear junk" are extremely low, but the material can still be used in dirty bombs -- typical explosives that might spread dangerous radioactivity in the event of an explosion.

For lots more information on nuclear bombs and their history, see the next page.